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We present a tractable model for the analysis of the relationship between economic growth and the
intensive and extensive margins of technology adoption. At the aggregate level, our model is isomorphic
to a neoclassical growth model. The microeconomic underpinnings of growth come from technology
adoption of firms, both at the extensive and the intensive margin. We use a data set of 15 technologies
and 166 countries to estimate the intensive and extensive margin of adoption using the structural equations
derived from our model. We find that the variability across countries in the intensive margin is higher
than in the extensive margin. The cross country variation in intensive margin of adoption accounts
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Either as a fundamental or as a channel that amplies other fundamentals (e.g., in-
stitutions), technology is surely important to understanding why there are rich and poor
countries. However, several factors have limited economists' ability to assess its importance
quantitatively. Broadly speaking, the goal of this paper is to overcome some of these di-
culties.
One signicant limitation in eorts to assess the role of technology has been the lack
of direct measures of technology. Traditionally, technology diusion has been measured as
the share of producers who adopt a given technology (Griliches, 1957, Manseld, 1961 and
Gort and Klepper, 1982). Computing this measure requires rm-level data which are hard
to collect for a large number of years, countries, and technologies. Consequently, economists
have been unable to measure technology diusion comprehensively.
Comin and Hobijn (2004) and Comin, Hobijn and Rovito (2006) present a new approach
to measuring technology. They measure either the number of units of capital in a country
that embody the new technology (e.g., the number of telephones) or the amount of output
produced with the new technology (e.g., the tons of steel produced in blast oxygen furnaces).
These measures have two advantages over traditional measures of technology diusion. First,
they just require data at the country level. Thus, it is easier to collect them for a large
number of countries, technologies and years.1 Second, they capture the number of units of
the technology adopted by each adopter.2
As with any new data set, these new technology measures introduce the challenge of
nding ways to extract information relevant to modeling the technology diusion process.
That is, they present the challenge of mapping the data into dimensions that we can interpret
through the lens of our models.
Consider Figure 1 for an example of one technology in Comin, Hobijn and Rovito (2006).
Figure 1 reports the number of land line phone calls normalized by total output for the
United States, Australia, Japan, Malawi, Pakistan and Burkina Faso. These curves roughly
appear to be the graphic result of plotting a single curve and then shifting it both horizontally
1The CHAT data set described in Comin and Hobijn (2009) contains information about the diusion of
104 technologies in 166 countries over the last 200 years.
2As shown by Comin, Hobijn and Rovito (2008), technology measures that include this dimension do not
diuse following a logistic curve which is characteristic of traditional measures (Griliches, 1957).THE INTENSIVE MARGIN OF TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 3
and vertically. The hypothesis that this apparent graphic result reects the actual process
of technology adoption across countries was broadly conrmed in formal tests conducted in
Comin and Hobijn (2010). Assuming this characterization of technology adoption, we can
fully describe cross-country dierences in technology dynamics if we know what drives the
horizontal and vertical shifts in the diusion curves. Section 1 develops a model based on
Comin and Hobijn (2010) that provides a micro-foundation for these shifts.
A technology, in our model, is a group of production methods used to make an interme-
diate good or provide a service. We consider two aspects of technology adoption, which we
call the \extensive" and \intensive" margins. The extensive margin of technology adoption
gauges how long it takes a country to adopt a technology. Adopting a production method
requires incurring in a xed investment. The timing of this investment determines the lag
with which production methods arrive in a country. In section 2, we show that the horizon-
tal shifts seen in Figure 1 measure adoption lags. We call this lag the extensive margin of
adoption.
Once a technology has been introduced, the intensive margin of adoption captures how
many units of the good embodying it are demanded relative to aggregate demand. The
intensive margin is determined by the productivity and price of goods that embody the
technology and the cost that individual producers face in learning how to use it. Other
things equal, these variables produce vertical shifts in the evolution of observable measures
of technology adoption such as displayed in Figure 1. We call the vertical shift the intensive
margin.
In this paper we pay particular attention to the intensive margin. To be clear, our
goal is not to assess how important a particular factor may be in aecting the intensive
margin of technology adoption. Instead, we just intend to understand how important cross-
country dierences in this margin are in explaining cross-country dierences in productivity.
Answering this question does not require taking a strong stand on the nature of the drivers
of technology adoption.
Little has been known about how signicant a role the intensive margin of technology
adoption plays in determining overall productivity performance. Clark' s (1988) classic
study on spinning-machine spindles documents large cross-country dierences in the number4 COMIN AND MESTIERI
of spindles that each worker operated circa 1900 and argues that this factor was a major
contributor to dierences in productivity. However, observing more units of a new technology
in rich countries is not sucient to establish the importance of the intensive margin for
aggregate productivity, since it could just reect reverse causation. In other words, higher
aggregate demand could lead to the adoption of more units of technology per worker.
Filtering out the eect of aggregate demand on observable measures of technology is a
key challenge that any attempt to assess the importance of the intensive margin needs to
confront. We follow two dierent approaches to deal with this issue. First, we use our model
predictions to pin down the income elasticity of our technology measures. On a balanced
growth path, the income elasticity of demand for the goods embodying technology must equal
one. Using this restriction we can lter out the eect of aggregate demand on technology
adoption and then use the model to formalize the intuitions described above and identify
the intensive and extensive margins of adoption.
Our second approach relaxes the restrictions of a balanced growth path (despite its
appeal over long periods we study) to check the robustness of our ndings. Here we use
the time series dimension of our panel to estimate the income elasticity of demand for goods
embodying a technology. Because of the need for long time series to carry out this exercise
and because we want to reduce possible biases in the estimates of the intensive margin,3 we
proceed in two steps. First, we estimate the income elasticity of demand for goods embodying
a technology using only U.S. data, and then we impose this estimate on the other countries
to estimate the intensive adoption margin and the adoption lags for each technology-country
pair.
We use data for 15 technologies and 166 countries, as in Comin, Hobijn, and Rovito
(2006). Our data cover major technologies related to transportation, telecommunication,
information technology, health care, steel production, and electricity. We obtain precise and
plausible estimates of the adoption lags for two thirds of the 1294 technology-country pairs
for which we have sucient data.
Our exploration of the intensive margin of adoption, complementing Comin and Hobijn's
(2010) analysis of the extensive margin, delivers four main ndings. First, the magnitude
3See section 2.3 for more details.THE INTENSIVE MARGIN OF TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 5
of cross-country dierences in the intensive margin of adoption and adoption lags are large.
On average, they are 20% larger than the cross-country dispersion in per capita income.
Second, there are signicant dierences across technologies in the cross-country dispersion in
the intensive margin. For example, the dispersion in electricity and passenger rail represents
40% of the dispersion in per capita income, while in blast oxygen steel represents 170% of the
dispersion in income. Third, a variance decomposition reveals that 33% of the variation in
the intensive margin can be attributed to cross-technology variation, 43% can be attributed
to cross-country variation, and the remaining 23% is not explained by these two factors.
Fourth, the cross-country dispersion in adoption lags has declined monotonically over time.
Specically, for every decade later that a technology has been invented, the dispersion has
been two years smaller. In contrast, we do not observe any cross country convergence in the
intensive margin of adoption.
Our model is similar at the aggregate level to the neoclassical growth model, except that
in our model the level of total factor productivity (TFP) is endogenous. In particular, TFP
depends on both the intensive and extensive margins of technology adoption. We use this
result to assess the magnitude of the cross-country dierences in labor productivity that
our estimated dierences in the intensive margin generate. We nd that dierences in the
intensive margin of adoption account for 44% of cross-country dierences in income per
capita. As our model makes clear, these eects could be fundamentally driven by dierences
in the costs individual producers face in adopting the new technologies or by dierences in
the overall eciency of the economy that aect the intensity of adoption.
Finally, we show that the empirical results obtained in the baseline model hold when we
allow for non-homothetic production functions that do not pin down the income elasticity
of demand for goods embodying a new technology. For instance, the intensive margin still
accounts for 52% of the cross-country variation in income per capita.
This paper is related to three strands of the literature. First, macroeconomic models of
technology adoption (e.g., Parente and Prescott, 1994, and Basu and Weil, 1998) have tried
to understand the role of technology in determining TFP. However, these studies have used
an abstract concept of technology that is hard to match with data. Second, the applied mi-
croeconomic technology diusion literature (Griliches, 1957, Manseld, 1961, and Gort and6 COMIN AND MESTIERI
Klepper, 1982, among others) has focused on estimating diusion curves for technologies in
dierent countries. However, these studies have only been able to investigate a relatively
small number of technologies and countries. Moreover, the diusion curves are purely sta-
tistical descriptions, not embedded in an aggregate model. Hence, it is dicult to use them
to explore the aggregate implications of the ndings.
Finally, the closest reference to this paper is Comin and Hobijn (2010). This paper diers
from it in at least three important ways. First, our model provides a micro-foundation for
the intensive margin of adoption as well as for the extensive margin. Second, in our empirical
analysis we estimate and analyze the intensive margin of adoption. Third, we explore the
robustness of our ndings about the two margins of adoption by relaxing the balanced
growth restriction and allowing the income elasticity of the demand for the technology to be
endogenous.
The paper is divided into four sections. Section 1 sets out a one-sector neoclassical
growth model featuring intensive and extensive margins of adoption. Section 2 describes
the diusion patterns of technology under the balanced growth path assumption, derives
structural equations that can be estimated from the data, and explains how the margins
of adoption are identied. Section 3 presents the results of the estimation, and Section 4
concludes.
1 A one-sector growth model with extensive and
intensive technology adoption
We next present a one-sector growth model with endogenous technology adoption at the
extensive and intensive margins. The model maps the adoption margins into the time-path
of observable measures of technology diusion and illustrates how each adoption margin
aects endogenous TFP dierentials. In what follows, we omit the time subscript, t, where
obvious.THE INTENSIVE MARGIN OF TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 7
1.1 Preferences
A measure one of households populates the economy. They inelastically supply one unit







Here Ct denotes per capita consumption and  is the discount rate. We further assume that
capital markets are perfectly competitive and that consumers can borrow and lend at the
real rate e r.
1.2 Production
Technology:
Each instant, a new production method appears exogenously. We call these production
methods, technology vintages or simply vintages. Production methods are capital embodied.
The set of vintages available at time t is given by V = ( 1;t]. The productivity embodied
in new vintages grows at a rate  across vintages, such that
Zv = Z0e
v. (2)
Note that Zv is constant over time. This characterizes the evolution of the world tech-
nology frontier. We shall choose the normalization parameter Z0 such that vintage v has
productivity Zv.4
A country does not necessarily use all the capital vintages that are available in the world
because, as we discuss below, making them available for production is costly. The set of
vintages actually used is given by V = ( 1;t   D]. Here D  0 denotes the adoption lag.
That is, the amount of time between when the best technology in use in the country became
available and when it was introduced in the country.
In order to map the model into the data, we introduce the concept of technology. A
technology is a set of production methods used to produce closely related intermediates. To
4This implies that Z0 = Zve v.8 COMIN AND MESTIERI
simplify the exposition, we consider only two technologies: an old one, denoted by o, and a
new one, denoted by n. The old technology consists of the production methods introduced
up till a xed time v, such that the set of vintages associated with the old technology is
Vo = ( 1;v]. The new technology consists of the newest production methods, invented
after v, such that it covers Vn = (v;t   D].
Output:













;  2 fo;ng; (3)
where Yv denotes the intermediate output produced using technology vintage v: Final output






















Once a technology vintage v is brought to the country, producers can nd distinct ways
to use it. Because each application developed solves a new problem, the larger the number of
applications developed, Nv; the more ecient the production of intermediate service v is. In
other words, there are eciency gains from developing more applications:Each application
yields a dierentiated output, Yvi: Dierentiated outputs are produced monopolistically. A












; with  > 
0 > 1: (4)
Output Yvi is produced by combining labor and capital, Kvi; that embodies production






Capital goods production and taxes:
5This specication is similar to Benassy (1996). The assumption that  > 0 ensures that the prots of
a individual producer decline with Nv.THE INTENSIVE MARGIN OF TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 9
Capital goods are produced by monopolistic competitors. Each of them holds the patent of
the capital good used for a particular production method v. It takes one unit of nal output
to produce one unit of capital of any vintage. This production process is assumed to be fully
reversible. For simplicity, we assume that there is no physical depreciation of capital. The
capital goods suppliers rent out their capital goods at the rental rate RRv. Rv is the price
received by the capital goods producer, while the wedge R captures a tax on the price of
capital that the government rebates back to the consumers with a lump sum transfer. R is
constant across vintages and over time. Below we show that R can capture a wide range of
institutional distortions that aect the eciency of the economy.
Technology adoption costs:
There are two types of adoption costs. The cost of bringing to the country the production
method associated with a capital vintage,  e
vt, and the cost incurred by each individual
producer to nd a distinct application of a production method that is already available,  i
vt.
We dene the former as the extensive and the latter as the intensive adoption costs. Both
of these are sunk costs. The extensive cost of adopting vintage v at time t is given by (6)

































In these expressions, At is the aggregate level of TFP to be dened below, be; bi; and 	 are
constants. The parameters be and bi reect barriers to adoption for the agent that adapts
the technology to the idiosyncrasies of the country or for individual producers that nd
a protable use for the technology. 	 is the steady state stock market capitalization to
GDP ratio and is included for normalization purposes. The term (Zv=Zt) captures the idea
that it is more costly to adopt technologies the higher is their productivity relative to the
productivity of the frontier technology. The last two terms capture that the cost of adoption
is increasing in the market size. We choose these formulations because, just like the adoption10 COMIN AND MESTIERI
cost function in Parente and Prescott (1994), they yield an aggregate balanced growth path.6
1.3 Factor demands, output, and optimal adoption
The demand for the output produced with vintage v is:
Yv = Y (Pv)
 










We use the nal good as the numeraire good throughout our analysis and normalize its

























Note that all producers of dierentiated outputs associated to a given vintage face the
same demand and have access to the same technology. As a result, they will charge the same












;for i 2 [0;Nv]
where Rv is the rental price of a unit of capital that embodies vintage v; R is a tax on




The revenue share of capital is  and labor exhaust the remaining revenue. This implies
6It could of course be the case that the linearity in the adoption cost function is violated for some
particular technology for some particular country, without necessarily violating balanced growth, but to the
extent that we are documenting adoption lags across many technologies this is perhaps not so critical.THE INTENSIVE MARGIN OF TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 11





























The supplier of each capital good takes as given the number of dierentiated output
producers but recognizes that the rental price he charges for the capital good, Rv, aects
the price of the output associated with the capital good and, therefore, its demand, Yv. The
price elasticity of demand she faces, ; is constant. As a result, the prot maximizing rental
price equals a constant markup times the marginal production cost of a unit of capital, which
we assume is equal to a unit of nal output.
Because of the durability of capital and the reversibility of its production process, the
per-period marginal production cost of capital is the user-cost of capital. Thus, the rental
price that maximizes the prots accrued by the capital good producer is





 1 is the constant gross markup factor.
Aggregate representation:
Our model has the following aggregate representation of production:
Y = AK
L








































The market value of each dierentiated output producer equals the present discounted value





















































is the stock market capitalization to GDP ratio.
Optimal adoption implies that, every instant, the value of becoming a user of a technology
vintage v does not exceed the intensive cost of adoption. That is, for all vintages, v, that
are adopted at time t
 
i



























The market value of each capital goods supplier equals the present discounted value of the

























Optimal adoption implies that, every instant, all the vintages for which the value of the rm
that produces the capital good is at least as large as the adoption cost will be adopted. ThatTHE INTENSIVE MARGIN OF TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 13
is, for all vintages, v, that are adopted at time t
 
e
v  Mv (19)
This holds with equality for the best vintage adopted if there is a positive adoption lag.
















and is constant across vintages, v.7 The lag with which new vintages are adopted is increasing
in the adoption costs, be; and the tax wedge, R; is decreasing in Nv and in the deviation of
the stock market to output ratio from its steady state level. As shown in equation (16), the
number of producers that develop distinct uses for technology vintage v, Nv; declines with
the intensive cost of adoption, bi; and increases with the deviation of the stock market to
output ratio from the balance growth level.8
Conversely, there are several signicant factors that do not inuence the adoption decisions:
First, given the specications of the production function and the costs of adoption, the mar-
ket size symmetrically aect the benets and costs of adoption at both the intensive and
extensive margins. Hence, variation in market size does not aect the timing of adoption, D;
and the number of producers that use a new vintage, Nv: By the same token, the adoption
margins are not aected by the productivity of technology at time zero, Z0: Second, since on
the balanced growth path 	 = 	, the steady-state adoption lags and number of producers
do not depend on the stock market to output ratio.
These observations together with equation (12) help us understand what drives aggregate
TFP in this model. Three factors can drive cross-country dierences in TFP: The adoption
lag, the number of producers that adopt each technology vintage, and the normalized pro-
7In what follows we focus on the interior case where  t  Mt.
8Note that R does not aect the intensity of adoption as measured by the number of producers that adopt
a new vintage. That is the case because, from the perspective of the potential producers of dierentiated
outputs, R only aects aggregate demand. Aggregate demand, in turn, has a symmetric eect on the costs
and benets of adopting the vintage for the dierentiated output producers. Instead, corporate income taxes
(or expropriation risk) also aect the prot margin net of taxes. This asymmetric eect would aect the
number of producers that adopt the new vintage.14 COMIN AND MESTIERI
ductivity level of the initial vintage. Note that, Z0 aects directly aggregate TFP but, as
mentioned above, has no eect through D or Nv: The costs of adopting new technologies
aect TFP because they inuence the range of technologies available for production and
how many dierent applications are developed. Finally, the tax wedge (and other related
frictions) only aect aggregate TFP through their eect on the adoption decisions.
2 Diusion of the new technology
We dene the equilibrium of this economy in Appendix B. In what follows, we focus on the
balanced growth path of the economy.9 Along the balanced growth path, adoption lags,
D, are constant, the number of adopters that adopt each vintage once it is available in the
country is constant and equal to N; and the economy grows at a constant rate equal to
=(1   ).10
So far, we have derived expressions for output and capital at the vintage level. However,
because of the nature of available data, we are interested in the total demand for capital goods
and the output produced with the production methods that make up the new technology































Substituting in for Zv, and recognizing that, along the balanced growth path, the adop-
tion lag and the number of dierentiated producers are constant and equal to D and Nn;
9The transitional dynamics of the model are similar to the one described in the working paper version of
Comin and Hobjin (2009).
10Of course, D and N could dier across countries.THE INTENSIVE MARGIN OF TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 15
























The path of the new technology TFP is driven by the adoption margins. First, there are
eciency gains from the number of producers that adopt a given vintage. This aects the
level of technology through the `intensity of adoption' term in (23). The trend in TFP is
driven by the economy-wide adoption of new, more productive, vintages. The adoption lag
determines the best vintage adopted and aects the level of TFP through the `embodiment
eect' term in (23). Finally, adoption lags also drive the curvature of An at a given moment in
time: The marginal productivity gain from adopting new vintages decreases as more vintages
are adopted. Because the adoption lag determines how far in the adoption process a country
is at time t; they aect the evolution of the slope through the `variety eect'. Graphically,
this eect is captured by horizontal shifts in the path of An as adoption lags vary. We shall
use this result to identify the adoption lags in the data.
These properties of the path for the level of TFP for technology  aects the output and
capital associated with the technology through its eect on the marginal cost of production













Our goal is to estimate the intensity of adoption and adoption lags for the dierent technology-
country pairs in our data set. We extend the results above by allowing multiple sectors, each
adopting a new technology.11 We do that with a nested CES aggregator, where 
 1 reects
the between sectors elasticity of demand and

 1 is, just as in the one-sector model, the
within sector elasticity of demand. We allow 
 1 to vary across sectors. Further, we allow
the growth rate of embodied technological change, , and the invention date, v, to vary
11Comin and Hobijn (2008) derive the multi-sector version of a similar model in detail.16 COMIN AND MESTIERI
across technologies. We denote the technology measures for which we derive reduced form
equations by m 2 fy;kg. Small letters denote logarithms.
These modications yield the following demand for technology  output




Combining that with the intermediate goods price (24)
p =  ln   a + (1   )(y   l) + r + lnR; (26)
we obtain the reduced form equation (27) for y.
y = y +

   1
[a   (1   )(y   l)   r + ln   lnR] (27)
Similarly, we obtain the reduced form equation for k by combining the log-linear capital
demand equationwith (25) and (26),
k = y +
1
   1
[a   (1   )(y   l)   r + ln   lnR] + ln   r   lnR: (28)
These expressions depend on the intensive margin and adoption lag D through their ef-
fect on the productivity term, a: Comin and Hobijn (2010) show that, to a rst order
approximation,
a  (
0   1)n + zv + (   1)ln(t   T) +

2
(t   T), (29)
where T = v + D is the time when the technology is adopted. In this approximation,
the growth rate of embodied technological change, , only aects the linear trend in a.12
12Intuitively, when there are very few vintages in V the growth rate of the number of vintages, i.e. the
growth rate of t   T, is very large and it is this growth rate that drives growth in a through the variety
eect. Only in the long-run, when the growth rate of the number of varieties tapers o, the growth rate of
embodied productivity, , becomes the predominant driving force over the variety eect.THE INTENSIVE MARGIN OF TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 17
Substituting this into (25) and (28) yields the following reduced form equation
m = 1 + y + 2t + 3 ((   1)ln(t   T)   (1   )(y   l)) + ", (30)
where " is the error term. The reduced form parameters are given by the 's. Note that,
the homothetic nature of the production function implies that the coecient of aggregate
demand, y, is equal to one.
According to our theoretical model, the intercept 1 is given by the following expression








0   1)n + zv)  
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0   1)n + zv)  

2
T   (r + lnR   ln())
i
  r   lnR: (32)
We dene the intensive margin of adoption of technology  in country j as
Mj= ((
0   1)n + zv)   (r + lnR   ln()): (33)
Three dierent factors aect the intensive margin of adoption: the number of adopters
of the technology, n; the normalized productivity level of the technology, zv; and the
distortions in the price of capital, r + lnR:
2.2 Identication and estimation procedure
We use the reduced form equation in (30) to identify the adoption lags and the intensity of
adoption. To this end, we assume that preference parameters () and technology parame-
ters other than adoption costs (i.e., ; ; 0;  ; and zv) are the same across countries.
This implies that the equilibrium interest rate (r) is also the same across countries.13 The
distortions that aect the eciency of the economy (R) and the adoption cost parameters
(be and bi) can vary across countries. As a result, the adoption lags (D) and the number of
producers that adopt a technology (n) can also dier across countries.
13Our identication strategy is unaected if interest rates, r; and the normalized productivity level for the
new technologies,zv; varied across countries.18 COMIN AND MESTIERI
These assumptions impose some cross-country parameter restrictions. Since the intercept
term, 1; depends on n; D and R; it can vary across countries. The trend-parameter, 2,
just depends on  and ; so it is assumed to be constant across countries.14 3 only depends
on the technology parameter, , and is therefore assumed to be constant across countries.
We do not estimate  and . Instead, we calibrate  = 1:3, based on the estimates of the
markup in manufacturing from Basu and Fernald (1997), and  = 0:3 consistent with the
post-war U.S. labor share.15
The parameter 1 is a technology-country specic constant. Therefore, it can be identied
by a technology-country xed eect. Once we have an estimate of 1; we still need an
estimate of the adoption lags to obtain an estimate of the intensive margin of adoption. We
follow Comin and Hobijn (2010) and identify the adoption lags through the non-linear trend
component in equation (30), which reects the variety eect. Intuitively, after controlling
for the observables such as GDP or labor productivity, only the adoption lag aects the
curvature of m. That implies that, ceteris paribus, if we see two countries one with a
steeper diusion curve than the other at a given point in time, this means that the former
started adopting the technology later.
For each technology, we report the intensive margin measures relative to the U.S. Note
that our estimates of 1 in (31) and (32) are not directly comparable for technologies mea-
sured with capital and output variables. To construct comparable measures of intensive
margin of adoption, we need to eliminate the dierential eect of R that appears on the
technologies measured using capital. To this end, we regress, for each country, the intercepts
in (31) and (32) on a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the technology is measured in
capital units. The coecient on the dummy captures the dierential eect of R. We then
subtract the dummy coecient from 
k
1; and correct for the factors =(   1) and 1=(   1)
to obtain the measure of the intensive margin in (33).16;17
14The output elasticity of capital is one minus the labor share in our model. Gollin (2002) provides
evidence that the labor share is approximately constant across countries.
15As argued by Comin and Hobijn (2008), the estimates of the adoption parameters are very robust to
alternative calibrations of these parameters.
16The parameter  is computed as the average (across technologies) implied estimate from the estimates
of 3 and it is equal to 1.31 for the homothetic case and 1.14 for the non-homothetic case.
17An alternative approach could be to take advantage of the fact that we have two measures of railways
that are measured as output (passengers and freight) and one that is measured as capital (rail lines). UnderTHE INTENSIVE MARGIN OF TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 19
This identication strategy assumes that the underlying curvature of the diusion curves
is the same across countries. This assumption would be violated, for example, if the eciency
of an economy increased over time non-linearly inducing a similar pattern in the technology
measure. Of course, a priori, there is no reason why the distortions in the economy evolve
to induce such a specic pattern of adoption rather than aecting the trend or adding noise
to the evolution of technology. Nevertheless, Comin and Hobijn (2010) take seriously this
hypothesis and test formally the identication assumption by allowing 3 to vary across
countries. Then, they see how often they can reject the null that the unrestricted and the
restricted estimates are the same (i.e. ^ 
u
3 = ^ 3). They nd that they cannot reject the null
in two thirds of the technology-country pairs considered. Further, the estimated adoption
lags in the restricted and unrestricted specications are very highly correlated suggesting
that, eectively, the deviations from a constant curvature pattern are not quantitatively
important.
Because the adoption lag is a parameter that enters non-linearly in (30) for each coun-
try, estimating the system of equations for all countries together is practically not feasible.
Instead, we take a two-step approach. We rst estimate equation (30) using only data for
the U.S. This provides us with estimates of the values of 1 and D for the U.S. as well as
estimates of 2 and 3 that should hold for all countries. In the second step, we separately
estimate 1 and D, using (30) conditional on the estimates of 2 and 3 based on the U.S.
data, for all the countries in the sample besides the U.S.
Besides practicalities, this two-step estimation method is preferable to a system estima-
tion method for two other reasons. First, in a system estimation method, data problems for
one country aect the estimates for all countries. Since we judge the U.S. data to be most
reliable, we use them for the inference on the parameters that are constant across countries.
Second, our model is based on a set of stark neoclassical assumptions. These assumptions
are more applicable to the low frictional U.S. economic environment than to that of countries
in which capital and product markets are substantially distorted. Thus, if we think that our
the plausible assumption that the average intercept of the output measures (passenger and freight measures)
corresponds to the rail line measure used in the country, we can back out the additional eect of R on the
capital measures of technology. Then, we can subtract this additional eect from the other capital measures
and can construct comparable measures of the intensive margin. The results we obtain using this procedure
are similar to the ones reported in the main text.20 COMIN AND MESTIERI
reduced form equation is more likely to be mis-specied for some countries other than the
U.S., including them in the estimation of the joint parameters would aect the results for
all countries.
We estimate all the equations using non-linear least squares. Since we estimate 3 for
the U.S., this means that the identifying assumption that we make is that the logarithm of
per capita GDP in the U.S. is uncorrelated with the technology-specic error, ". However,
because of the cross-country restrictions we impose on 3, the risk of simultaneity bias is
not a concern for all the other countries in our sample.
2.3 Non-homotheticities
One general concern in structural estimation exercises is model mis-specication. In the
context of our model, the place where this concern probably is more relevant is in the
elasticity of technology with respect to income. For our model to have a balanced growth
path, the production functions need to be homothetic. This implies that the income elasticity
of technology measures is equal to one. In this subsection, we explore the implications for
the estimated equations (30) if we replace the original production function (3) for a more
general specication that allows for non-homotheticities.





















This yields the following reduced form equation
m = 1 + yy + 2t + 3 ((   1)ln(t   T)   (1   )(y   l)) + ", (34)
which diers from (30) in that y is not restricted to be equal to 1. It will be greater thanTHE INTENSIVE MARGIN OF TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 21
one if   >  and smaller otherwise.
As in the homothetic reduced form equation (30), we estimate the coecients in (34)
that depend on technological parameters (2; 3 and y) for the U.S. and then impose these
estimates in the other countries. The only dierence is that now we estimate an additional
parameter, y.
Using the U.S. estimate of y has several advantages. First, reliable data on U.S. real
GDP is available since 1820. This long time-span facilitates the identication. It also
ensures that the estimate is based on the various stages of development that the U.S. has
gone through over the last two centuries. As a result, it should capture reasonably well
the eect of aggregate demand on technology diusion for countries at dierent stages of
development. Most importantly, since for each technology-country pair, the intensive margin
in our model is constant, by exploiting the time series dimension to identify y we avoid the
bias due to the potential cross-country correlation between the intensive margin of adoption
and income.
Identifying y using only the time series dimension is not trivial for two reasons. First,
since  may dier across technologies, when estimating 2 we must include a time trend for
each technology. Since in the long run log GDP is approximately linear, GDP and time are
co-linear over very low frequencies. Second, most technologies in our sample are embodied in
capital goods. The high cyclicality and volatility of investment shall induce a high estimate
of y: This estimate however, would capture the cyclical properties of capital rather than
the eect of aggregate demand on our technology measures at lower frequencies.
To overcome these two diculties, we use a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) lter to decompose
log of real GDP into a high frequency component and a `trend'. As is well known,18 trends
that result from HP lters have signicant uctuations at medium term frequencies.19 By
exploiting this variation, we could in principle identify y: Thus, we introduce separately the
high frequency component and the `trend' in log real GDP and estimate a dierent elasticity
for each.20;21 To identify y in our data, we estimate simultaneously the system of equations
18E.g. Comin and Gertler (2006).
19In the context of this exercise, medium term frequencies means cycles with periods between 8 years and
innity.
20We have obtained very similar results when including only the `trend' component of GDP.
21As conjectured, the short-run elasticity is signicantly higher, capturing adjustment over the business22 COMIN AND MESTIERI
(34) for all the U.S. technologies.
Though in our model the parameters that determine the intensive margin are xed, it is
instructive to consider how will our estimate of y be aected if they vary in the data. The
rst thing to realize is that institutions, human capital and other factors that may aect the
costs of adoption at the intensive margin in the U.S. have changed very slowly. As a result,
this may have eects on our technology measures and on GDP only at very low frequencies.22
These frequencies are so low that most of these eects will be captured by the time trends
and will have little eect on the estimate of y:
Note further that, since naturally changes in institutions or variables that aect adoption
costs would induce a positive co-movement between GDP and technology, the small bias
induced on y would be upwards. As a result, when identifying the intensive margin we
would lter too much aggregate demand inducing a lower cross-country dispersion in the
intensive margin. That is, the bias in y would bias downwards the importance of the
intensive margin for development.
3 Results
We consider data for 166 countries and 15 major technologies, that span the period from
1820 through 2003. The technologies can be classied into 6 categories; (i) transporta-
tion technologies, consisting of steam and motor-ships, passenger and freight railways, cars,
trucks, and passenger and freight aircraft; (ii) telecommunication, consisting of telegraphs,
telephones, and cellphones; (iii) information technology, consisting of PCs and Internet
users; (iv) medical technology, namely MRI scanners; (v) steel produced using blast oxygen
furnaces; (vi) electricity.
The technology measures are taken from the CHAT data set.23 Real GDP and popu-
lation data are from Maddison (2007). Appendix A contains a brief description of each of
the 15 technology variables used. For our estimation, we only consider country-technology
combinations for which we have more than 10 annual observations. There are 1298 such
cycle.
22One example would be expansion of high school enrollment in the U.S. between 1910 and 1940.
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pairs in our data. The third column of Table 1 lists, for each technology, the number of
countries for which we have enough data.
We follow Comin and Hobijn (2010) and analyze only the technology-country pairs for
which we have plausible and precise estimates of the adoption lags. These are estimates with
an adoption date later than the invention year plus 10, and with small standard errors.24
We have plausible and precise estimates for 837 technology-country pairs, which represent
approximately two thirds of the total.
3.1 Estimated Intensive Margin
Dispersion
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of our estimates of the intensive margin of adoption
relative to the United States. The fth column reports the cross-country average. This
statistic is negative for all the technologies but ships and freight railways. This means that
for all the technologies but these two, the U.S. intensive margin is higher than the average
in our sample.
Column 6 reports the cross-country standard deviation of the intensive margin of adoption
by technology while column 10 reports the inter-quartile range.25 The conclusions are robust
to using any of these two measures of dispersion so, for brevity, we base our discussion on
the cross-country standard deviation. The dispersion in the intensive adoption margin varies
signicantly by technology ranging from 0.33 (rail passenger) to 0.89 (blast oxygen steel).
To have a benchmark, we report, in column 12, (1   ) times the cross-country standard
deviation in log per capita income in 2000 for the same sample of countries for which we have
plausible and precise estimates of the adoption margins for each technology.26 The ratio of
the standard deviation in the intensive margin to the standard deviation of per capita income
24Comin and Hobjin (2010) discuss several reasons for obtaining implausible estimates. The 10 year cut
o point for plausible estimates is to allow for inference error. The cuto we use in the standard error of
the estimate of T for it to be precise is
p
2003   v. This allows for longer condence intervals for older
technologies with potentially more imprecise data. Including imprecise estimates in our analysis does not
aect the conclusions.
25The inter-quartile range is dened as the dierence between the adoption intensities in countries in the
75 and 25 percentiles.
26We scale down log income by the factor (1   ) because, in addition to the eect through TFP, the
extensive margin also induces a higher capital-labor ratio which also aects the level of per capita output.24 COMIN AND MESTIERI
is on average 1.2, but it ranges signicantly across technologies: from 0.4 (for railways and
electricity)27 to 1.72 for (blast oxygen steel). This suggests that technology-specic factors
are important drivers of the cross-country variation in the intensive margin.
Evolution
The evolution of the intensive margin may be help us understand the dynamics of growth
over the last two centuries. At rst sight, the cross-country dispersion of the intensive margin
seems to be uncorrelated with the invention date. We test this observation in the rst column
of Table 2, which reports the estimates from a regression of the average intensive margin,
the cross-country dispersion and inter-quartile range on the year of invention. The regres-
sions conrm an insignicant relationship between the dispersion of the intensive margin of
adoption and the invention date of the technology.
One possible reason for the stationary nature of the dispersion of the intensive margin
could be that our estimates of this dispersion for early adopters of early technologies are
smaller than they should be because of the eect of the replacement of dominated technolo-
gies. The argument would be as follows. Some of the early technologies were dominated by
superior technologies a long time ago. For early adopters such as the United States, the level
of our measures for their intensive margin has been declining. As a result, the estimated
intercept is lower than in late adopters, where these technologies have been dominated more
recently. Under this hypothesis, cross-country dispersion in the intensive margin with which
early technologies were adopted might have been larger than it now appears in the statistics.
The alternative, of course, is that the stationarity of the cross-country dispersion in the
intensive margin of adoption correctly represents the empirical facts.
To disentangle these two hypothesis, we re-estimate our baseline regression for the old
technologies using only data up to 1939, when presumably none of the early technologies
was yet obsolete. Table 3 compares the estimates of the average, standard deviation and
inter-quartile range of the intensive margin of adoption for the countries for which we can
precisely estimate the diusion equation using data up to 1939.28 The results vary a little by
27In particular, the ratio is 0.4 for passenger-Km moved by railways.
28For obvious reasons, we only report the estimates for technologies invented before 1900.THE INTENSIVE MARGIN OF TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 25
technology but, overall, there are no signicant increases in the dispersion of the intensive
margin of adoption when we restrict the sample to the pre-1939 period. This implies that
the dispersion in the intensive margin of adoption for early technologies is not driven by
the fact that early technologies have been dominated sooner in countries that adopted them
rst.
The lack of convergence in the intensive margin contrasts with the evolution of the disper-
sion in adoption lags. Column 11 of Table 1 reports the cross-country standard deviation of
the adoption lags for each technology. It is evident at rst sight that dispersion in adoption
lags has decreased monotonically over the last two centuries. That is, the dierence in adop-
tion lags across countries has been much smaller for technologies invented in the recent past
than for those invented in the more distant past. Column 3 in Table 2 test this observation
formally. The negative relationship between cross-country dispersion in adoption lags and
invention date is statistically signicant. In particular, technologies invented ten years later
have a dispersion that is two years smaller.
Variance decomposition
Understanding the sources of variation in the intensive margin of adoption is beyond the
scope of this paper. However, we can explore whether this variation is mostly driven by
country eects or by technology eects. Specically, let j measure the intensive margin
of country j in technology . We can decompose j as follows
j = j +  + ui; (35)
where j is a country xed eect,  is a technology xed eect and ui is an error term.
The rst line of Table 4 examines the contribution of the country xed eects alone. That is,
the R2 when estimating (35) with only country xed eects. Country-specic factors explain
approximately 44% of the variation in the intensive margin of adoption. In the second row,
we calculate the contribution of technology-specic xed eects in an analogous manner and
nd that they explain 34% of the variation. The last row of Table 4 shows that country
and technology specic factors jointly account for approximately 77% of the variation in the26 COMIN AND MESTIERI
intensive margin. Of this total variation, 43% can be directly attributed to country eects,
33% can be directly attributed to technology eects, and the remaining 1% is due to the
covariance between these eects which diers from zero because our panel is unbalanced.
The drivers of the variance in the intensive margin dier quite a bit from the drivers of
the variance for the extensive. As shown in Comin and Hobijn (2010), the technology xed
eects account for 65% of the variance in the adoption lags. In contrast, country xed eects
are the main factor when accounting for the variance of the intensive margin of adoption.
Non-homotheticities
As discussed in the identication section, we want to explore an alternative approach to
dealing with the endogeneity of income in estimating the intensive margin. So far we have
used restrictions imposed by the assumption of balanced growth on the elasticity of our
technology measures with respect to GDP (equation 30). We would like to explore how
robust the estimates of the intensive margin are to using other identication schemes. In
particular, the alternative scheme consists in identifying the eect of aggregate demand on
technology by using the time series variation in GDP in the United States and then imposing
the estimate of the U.S. income elasticity when estimating the reduced form equation (34)
for the other countries.
As discussed above, when estimating the income elasticity for the United States, we
want to distinguish between the short and long run income elasticities, since the former is
likely to capture cyclical variation in the demand for investment goods. This presumption
is conrmed by our estimates. We nd that the long-run income elasticity is 2.2, while the
short-run is 6.6. Both estimates are very precise.
The additional exibility allowed in the model comes at the cost of a lower precision in the
estimates of the adoption lag for two U.S. technologies: ships and electricity. This creates the
minor problem of having a less precise estimate for the United States in the intensive margin.
Since we do not want to have as baseline intensity for the technology an imprecise estimate,
for these two technologies, we take France as a reference rather than the United States.
Which country is taken as baseline is irrelevant for computing the cross-country dispersion
measures. However, the mean intensive margin of adoption may be aected; therefore, theTHE INTENSIVE MARGIN OF TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 27
average intensive margin is not directly comparable with the homothetic case.
We obtain plausible and precise estimates for 738 country-technology pairs. This repre-
sents 57% of our sample. The statistics for the estimated adoption lags and the intensive
margin are reported in Table 5. On average, adoption lags are slightly smaller (35 years
versus 45 years) when we allow for non-homotheticities. The cross-country dispersion in
adoption lags is also slightly smaller (33 years versus 39 years) under non-homotheticities.
However, the estimates of the adoption lags under both identication strategies are very
highly correlated (see column 3 in Table 6). The average correlation across technologies is
0.91, and ranges from 0.79 for electricity to 0.98 for cellphones, MRIs and the Internet.
The cross-country dispersion in both measures of the intensive margin quite similar (0.72
versus 0.68). Column 4 in Table 6 shows the correlation between the estimates of the
intensive margin of adoption in the homothetic and non-homothetic cases. On average the
correlations are high, approximately 0.87. By technology, they range from 0.6 for freight
railways to 0.97 for passenger aviation and cellphones.
Correlation with per capita income
Before using our model to conduct a development accounting exercise, it is revealing to
explore the correlation between per capita income and the intensive margin of adoption for
each technology. Table 7 reports these statistics for both the homothetic and non-homothetic
estimates. The correlations are sizable. In the homothetic case the average correlation
across technologies is 67% and in the non-homothetic case it is 64%. We nd some variation
across technologies. The correlation of the intensive margin with per capita income seems
to be lower for the earlier technologies, especially for ships and railways. Contrary to the
perception that information technologies may be closing the technological divide between
rich and poor countries, we nd that the intensive margin of these technologies (i.e. PCs,
cellphones, Internet) present quite high correlations with per capita income.
Table 7 also reports the correlation between the adoption lags and per capita income.
As shown by Comin and Hobijn (2010) for the homothetic case, the correlation is also fairly
high, approximately -46%. In the last column, we show that the there is also a signicant
correlation between the adoption lags in the non-homothetic case and per capita income28 COMIN AND MESTIERI
though slightly lower than in the homothetic case (-30%).
3.2 Development accounting
Next, we investigate how the estimated dierences in the intensive margin of adoption trans-
late into cross-country dierences in per capita income. To answer this question, we have
to (i) aggregate the technology-level estimates of the intensive margin to an economy-wide
measure of the intensive margin, and (ii) compute the eect of the aggregate intensive mar-
gin on per capita income. Both of these computations require the use of a model that maps
individual technologies into aggregate productivity. We naturally draw from the equilibrium
relationships of the model presented above.
Aggregate production, Y , can be expressed as
Y = AK
L



























Aggregate TFP depends on the adoption lag, D; the number of producers that adopter
each technology vintage, N; and the normalized level of productivity, Zv: The adoption lag
aects aggregate TFP because a higher D reduces the productivity embodied in the best
technology vintage available for production. The number of adopters per vintage, N, aects
TFP because their outputs are imperfect substitutes and there are eciency gains from a
greater variety of outputs.
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Taking logs, we obtain:




0   1)n + zv   (r + lnR   ln()] +
(t   D   v)
1   
where  c is a constant. The term in squared brackets is equal to the economy-wide intensive
margin of adoption. Subtracting the same expression for the U.S. yields
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(39)
where \ (yj   lj); ^ Dj and j denote, respectively, log-labor productivity, the adoption lag and
the intensive margin in country j relative to the U.S.29
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(40)
where var[X] denotes the variance of X; and cov[X;Y ] denotes the covariance between X and
Y: The rst term is the share of the cross-country variance in per-capita income accounted
for the intensive margin, while the second term is the share of income dierences accounted
for the extensive margin.30 Under our model, together these two terms should account for
100% of the cross-country dierences in productivity.
To implement the decomposition, we need to compute the aggregate intensive margin,
j: To this end, we assume that the intensive margins we have estimated using our sample
of technologies are representative of the average intensive margin of adoption across all the
technologies used in production. Under this assumption, the aggregate intensive margin in
country j is equal to the average intensive margin in the country across the technologies in
29Formally, \ (yj   lj)  (yj   lj)   (yUS   lUS) and ^ Dj  (Dj   DUS).
30This variance decomposition follows the decomposition in Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) and splits
the co-variance between the intensive and extensive margins evenly between the two terms.30 COMIN AND MESTIERI
our sample.31
Figure 2 plots the rst term in equation (39) against log per capita income in 2000 from
the Penn World Tables 6.2.32 The thicker dashed line corresponds to the regression line,
while the light grey line is the 45-line. The slope of the regression line is equal to the
contribution of the intensive margin in (40). We nd that the slope of the regression line is
0.44.33 This implies that the intensive margin of technology adoption accounts for 44% of
the log per capita GDP dierentials observed in the data.
Note that there is an heteroskedastic pattern, as poor countries have more variance in
the measure of the intensive margin. This may be explained by the fact that we have fewer
observations for poor countries than rich countries, and as a result, our measure of the
average intensive margin is more noisy in poor countries.
Finally, we perform a development accounting exercise analogous to the one discussed
above for the estimates obtained using a non-homothetic production function. The presence
of non-homotheticities prevents the existence of a simple aggregate production function such
as we have in our baseline model. To conduct this exercise, we assume, as a rst pass, that the
aggregate production function does not dier much from the one obtained in the homothetic
case. Since our goal is to evaluate the robustness of our ndings to alternative identication
schemes in the estimation of the intensive margin of technology, it is desirable to use the same
production function to draw the aggregate implications of the technology-specic estimates.
It turns out that the development accounting exercise for the non-homothetic estimates of
the intensive margin yields very similar results to the baseline exercise, as it can be seen in
Figure 3 The correlation between the intensive margin and income per capita is 0.67, and
the coecient on the regression is 0.52.
To sum up, this section suggests that dierences in the intensive margin of adoption







where Sj is the total number of technologies for which we have precise and plausible estimates in country j:
32Similar results obtain with data from Maddison.
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substantial share of income dierences are either caused or amplied by the intensive margin
of adoption is robust to the two identication strategies we have followed to deal with the
endogeneity of aggregate demand to technology.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have built and estimated a model of technology diusion and growth. Our
model predicts that the diusion path of individual technologies is determined by the lag
with which their dierent vintages are introduced in the country, the level of aggregate
demand and the intensive margin of adoption. Using these predictions and exploiting the
panel structure of our data set, we have identied the intensive and extensive margins of
adoption for over 800 technology-country pairs that correspond to the diusion of up to 15
major technologies in 166 countries. The estimates are robust to dierent strategies used to
estimate the elasticity of technology with respect to aggregate demand.
An analysis of the estimates yields signicant ndings. There is a large cross-country
dispersion in the intensive margin, though the dispersion varies signicantly across technolo-
gies. The cross-country dispersion in adoption lags has declined very signicantly over the
last two centuries, while we nd no such convergence pattern in the intensive margin.
In addition to describing accurately the diusion patterns of individual technologies, our
model yields a representation of aggregate productivity that allows us to relate income levels
to the intensive and extensive margins of technology adoption. We nd that approximately
45% of the cross-country variation in per capita income can be attributed to dierences in
the intensive margin. Comin and Hobijn (2010) reported that dierences in the extensive
margin account for at least 25% percent of the cross country variation in productivity. Taken
together, these results imply that the role of technology is crucial to understanding per capita
income dierences. In particular, the empirical estimates suggest that 70% of the dierences
in cross-country income per capita can be explained by dierences in technology adoption.
We anticipate that the ndings of this paper will stimulate three lines of research. First,
we would like to understand better the relative importance of the dierent drivers of the
intensive margin. In particular, we would like to assess what is the role played by adoption32 COMIN AND MESTIERI
costs, institutional constraints that aect the overall eciency of the economy and distor-
tions that aect the price of capital. Second, we plan to study the underpinnings of the
variation in adoption costs which this paper abstracts from. Specically, our ndings beg
the question of why adoption costs at both the extensive and intensive margin are so large
in developing countries. Finally, the dierences we have observed in both the intensive and
extensive margins across technologies suggest that maybe the dynamics of technology adop-
tion are important not only to understanding cross-country dierences in productivity but
to explaining the dynamics of growth over the last two centuries. In particular, we intend
to explore whether the dynamics of adoption uncovered in this paper can explain the Great
Divergence and the lack of absolute convergence over the post-war period.THE INTENSIVE MARGIN OF TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 33
References
[1] Basu, Susanto, and John G. Fernald. 1997. \Returns to Scale in U.S. Production:
Estimates and Implications." Journal of Political Economy, 105(2): 249-283.
[2] Basu, Susanto, and David N. Weil. 1998. \Appropriate Technology and Growth."
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(4): 1025-1054.
[3] Caselli, Francesco, and W. John Coleman. 2001. \Cross-Country Technology Dif-
fusion: The Case of Computers." American Economic Review - AEA Papers and Pro-
ceedings, 91(2): 328-335.
[4] Clark, Gregory. 1987. \Why Isn't the Whole World Developed? Lessons from the
Cotton Mills." Journal of Economic History, 47(1): 141-173.
[5] Comin, Diego, and Mark Gertler. 2006. \Medium Term Business Cycles." The
American Economic Review, (96)3: 523-551.
[6] Comin, Diego, and Bart Hobijn. 2004. \Cross-Country Technology Adoption: Mak-
ing the Theories Face the Facts." Journal of Monetary Economics, 51(1): 39-83.
[7] Comin, Diego, and Bart Hobijn. 2008. \An Exploration of Technology Diusion."
HBS working paper 08-093.
[8] Comin, Diego, and Bart Hobijn. 2010. \An Exploration of Technology Diusion."
The American Economic Review, forthcoming.
[9] Comin, Diego, Bart Hobijn, and Emilie Rovito. 2006. \Five Facts You Need to
Know About Technology Diusion." NBER Working Paper #11928.
[10] Comin, Diego, Bart Hobijn, and Emilie Rovito. 2008. \A New Approach to Mea-
suring Technology with an Application to the Shape of the Diusion Curves." Journal
of Technology Transfer, 33(2): 187-207.
[11] Gollin, Douglas. 2002. \Getting Income Shares Right." Journal of Political Economy,
110(2): 458-474.34 COMIN AND MESTIERI
[12] Gort, Michael, and Steven Klepper. 1982. \Time Paths in the Diusion of Product
Innovations." Economic Journal, 92: 630-653.
[13] Griliches, Zvi. 1957. "Hybrid Corn: An Exploration in the Economics of Technological
Change." Econometrica, 25(4): 501-522.
[14] Hall, Robert E., and Charles I. Jones. 1999. \Why Do Some Countries Produce So
Much More Output per Worker than Others?" Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(1):
83-116.
[15] Hsieh, Chang-Tai. 2002. \What Explains the Industrial Revolution in East Asia?
Evidence from the Factor Markets." American Economic Review, 92(3): 502-526.
[16] Jerzmanowski, Michael. 2007. \Total Factor Productivity Dierences: Appropriate
Technology vs. Eciency.", European Economic Review, 51(8): 2080-2110.
[17] Klenow, Peter J., and Andr es Rodr guez-Clare. 1997. \The Neoclassical Revival
in Growth Economics: Has It Gone Too Far?" NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 12:
73-103.
[18] Maddison, Angus. 2007. Contours of the World Economy 1-2030 AD: Essays in
Macro-Economic History. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[19] Manseld, Edwin. 1961. \Technical Change and the Rate of Imitation." Economet-
rica, 29(4): 741-766.
[20] Manuelli, Rodolfo, and Ananth Sheshadri. 2003. \Frictionless Technology Diu-
sion: The Case of Tractors." NBER Working Paper # 9604.
[21] Parente, Stephen L., and Edward C. Prescott. 1994. \Barriers to Technology
Adoption and Development." Journal of Political Economy, 102(2): 298-321.
[22] Saxonhouse, Gary R., and Gavin Wright. 2004. \Technological Evolution in Cot-
ton Spinning, 1878-1933." in The Fibre that Changed the World, eds. Douglas A. Farnie
and David J. Jeremy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.THE INTENSIVE MARGIN OF TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 35
[23] Young, Alwyn. 1992. \A Tale of Two Cities: Factor Accumulation and Technical
Change in Hong Kong and Singapore." NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 7: 13-54.
[24] Young, Alwyn. 1995. \The Tyranny of Numbers: Confronting the Statistical Realities
of the East Asian Growth Experience." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(3): 641-
680.
A Data
The data that we use are taken from two sources. Real GDP and population data are taken
from Maddison (2007). The data on the technology measure are from the Cross-Country
Historical Adoption of Technology (CHAT) data set, rst described in Comin, Hobijn, and
Rovito (2006). The fteen particular technology measures, organized by broad category,
that we consider are:
1. Steam and motor ships: Gross tonnage (above a minimum weight) of steam and
motor ships in use at midyear. Invention year: 1788; the year the rst (U.S.) patent
was issued for a steam boat design.
2. Railways - Passengers: Passenger journeys by railway in passenger-KM. Invention
year: 1825; the year of the rst regularly schedule railroad service to carry both goods
and passengers.
3. Railways - Freight: Metric tons of freight carried on railways (excluding livestock
and passenger baggage). Invention year: 1825; same as passenger railways.
4. Telegraph: Number of telegrams sent. Invention year: 1835; year of invention of
telegraph by Samuel Morse at New York University.
5. Telephone: Number of mainline telephone lines connecting a customer's equipment
to the public switched telephone network as of year end. Invention year: 1876; year of
invention of telephone by Alexander Graham Bell.36 COMIN AND MESTIERI
6. Electricity: Gross output of electric energy (inclusive of electricity consumed in power
stations) in KwHr. Invention year: 1882; rst commercial power-station on Pearl
Street in New York City.
7. Cars: Number of passenger cars (excluding tractors and similar vehicles) in use. In-
vention year: 1885; the year Gottlieb Daimler built the rst vehicle powered by an
internal combustion engine.
8. Trucks: Number of commercial vehicles, typically including buses and taxis (excluding
tractors and similar vehicles), in use. Invention year: 1885; same as cars.
9. Aviation - Passengers: Civil aviation passenger-KM traveled on scheduled services
by companies registered in the country concerned. Invention year: 1903; The year the
Wright brothers managed the rst successful ight.
10. Aviation - Freight: Civil aviation ton-KM of cargo carried on scheduled services by
companies registered in the country concerned. Invention year: 1903; same as aviation
- passengers.
11. Blast Oxygen Steel: Crude steel production (in metric tons) in blast oxygen furnaces
(a process that replaced Bessemer and OHF processes). Invention year: 1950; invention
of Blast Oxygen Furnace.
12. Cellphones: Number of users of portable cell phones. Invention year: 1973; rst call
from a portable cellphone.
13. Personal computers: Number of self-contained computers designed for use by one
person. Invention year: 1973; rst computer based on a microprocessor.
14. MRIs: Number of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) units in place. Invention year:
1977; rst MRI-scanner built.
15. Internet users: Number of people with access to the worldwide network. Invention
year: 1983; introduction of TCP/IP protocol.THE INTENSIVE MARGIN OF TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 37
B Equilibrium and diusion of the new technology
Let  t denote the total adoption costs at instant t: Then
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v _ Nv(t)dv: (41)
where _ D denotes the time derivative of the adoption lags. Note that along the Balance
Growth Path, the distribution over the vintages for which the measure of varieties adopted
becomes degenerate around vt and the aggregate costs become  i
vtNv.
The equilibrium path of the aggregate resource allocation in this economy can be dened
in terms of the following nine equilibrium variables fC;K;I; ;Y;A;N;D;V g. Just like in
the standard neoclassical growth model, the capital stock, K, is the only state variable. The
eight equations that determine the equilibrium dynamics of this economy are given by
(i) The consumption Euler equation.
(ii) The aggregate resource constraint34
Y = C + I +  . (42)
(iii) The capital accumulation equation

K =  K + I. (43)
(iv) The production function, (11), taking into account that in equilibrium L = 1.
(v) The adoption cost functions (6) and (7).
(vi) The technology adoption equations, which determine the adoption lag (20) and the
intensive margin of adoption (16).
34We assume that adoption costs are measured as part of nal demand, such that Y can be interpreted
as GDP.38 COMIN AND MESTIERI
(vi) The stock market to GDP ratio, (14).35
(vii) The aggregate TFP level, 12.
35The dynamics of 	e
t and 	i
t are what are considered in the system of equilibrium equations. For example,
the law of motion of for 	e
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Table 2: Evolution of the Distribution of the Intensive and Extensive Margin
100*Log-Intensive Margin Adoption Lag
Homothetic Non-Homothetic Homothetic Non-Homothetic
Mean -0.50 -0.21 -.50 -.40
(0.19) (0.10) (.06) (.06)
Std.Dev. 0.14 -0.04 -.22 -.23
(0.12) (0.07) (.02) (.04)
IQR 0.32 0.01 -.39 -.40
(0.18) (0.11) (.09) (.09)
Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis. Mean refers to the average of the intensive
or extensive margin. The Homothetic column refers to the baseline model, while the Non-homothetic
refers to the estimation with a non-homothetic production function. Std. Dev. refers to the Standard
Deviation and IQR, to the Interquartile Range (dierence between the 75th and 25th percentiles). All
these technology measures are regressed on the year of invention of the technology.
Table 3: Comparison of Intensive Margin Estimates up to 1939 versus Whole Sample
Adoption Number of Mean Mean Std.Dev. Std.Dev. IQR IQR
Technology Year Countries 1939 1939 1939
Ships 1788 12 0.06 -0.11 0.38 0.63 0.39 0.67
Rail Freight 1825 12 -0.49 -0.57 0.25 0.31 0.32 0.45
Rail Passengers 1825 17 0.14 0.24 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.23
Telegraph 1835 20 -0.13 -0.54 0.29 0.54 0.37 0.62
Telephone 1876 9 -0.38 -0.35 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.35
Electricity 1882 18 -0.24 -0.20 0.23 0.18 0.38 0.26
Cars 1885 11 -0.99 -0.75 0.56 0.48 0.63 0.60
Trucks 1885 10 -0.96 -1.01 0.63 0.73 1.00 1.02
Total -0.31 -0.37 0.51 0.56 0.59 0.69
Note: Number of countries is the number of countries for which we have plausible and precise estimates using
data up to 1939. Mean 1939 refers to the mean intensive margin of a technology obtained using data up to 1939.
Mean refers to the mean intensive margin of a technology obtained using data for the whole sample (up to 2003).
An analogous notation is used for the standard deviation (Std. Dev.) and the interquartile range (IQR).THE INTENSIVE MARGIN OF TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 41
Table 4: Analysis of variance
Model Country Technology Residual Total
SS eect eect SS SS
Country eect alone 44% 44% 56% 100%
Technology eect 34% 34% 66% 100%
Joint eect 77% 43% 33% 23% 100%
Note: Decomposition of the intensive margin estimates. The percentages are obtained from the ratio
of the sum of squares of the country or technology dummy over the total.
Table 5: Estimates of Adoption Lags and Intensive Margin allowing for non-homotheticities
Invention Number Plausible Adoption Lags Log-Int. Margin
Technology year of Countries and Precise Mean sd Mean sd
Ships 1788 61 31 101.61 59.72 0.5 0.82
Railways freight 1825 88 58 82.28 26.30 0.38 0.41
Rail passengers 1825 83 40 61.78 31.51 0.09 0.43
Telegraph 1835 69 37 38.39 32.03 0.02 0.59
Telephone 1876 143 64 44.73 31.37 0.15 0.62
Electricity 1882 138 50 34.42 25.60 -0.03 0.63
Trucks 1885 111 53 32.97 19.53 -0.23 0.57
Cars 1885 127 70 36.05 22.05 -0.25 0.7
Aviation freight 1903 96 36 37.58 14.89 -0.03 0.72
Aviation passengers 1903 99 53 27.98 13.95 -0.42 0.76
Blast Oxygen Furnaces 1950 50 41 15.63 6.68 0.03 0.5
PCs 1973 71 62 13.96 2.86 0.17 0.54
Cellphones 1973 87 75 13.44 3.85 -0.44 0.76
MRIs 1977 12 12 3.02 2.38 -0.01 0.34
Internet 1983 59 56 7.39 2.09 -0.06 0.47
Total 1294 738 35.87 33.53 -0.04 0.66
Note: Plausible and Precise estimates are dened as having an adoption year greater than 10 years before our invention date
(this allows for some inference error) and a standard error for the adoption year smaller than
p
2003   v. Sd stands for
Standard Deviation. The last line (Total) reports the sum of observations for columns 3 and 4 and the unweighted mean of
technology measures for columns 5 to 8.42 COMIN AND MESTIERI
Table 6: Correlation by Technology of Homothetic and Non-Homothetic Margins
Correlation Correlation
Technology Observations Intensive Extensive
Ships 30 0.88 0.96
Rail Passengers 55 0.82 0.93
Rail Freight 38 0.60 0.85
Telegraph 34 0.92 0.91
Telephone 59 0.89 0.96
Electricity 45 0.84 0.79
Trucks 51 0.86 0.88
Cars 63 0.89 0.86
Aviation Freight 29 0.95 0.96
Aviation Passengers 51 0.97 0.90
Blast Oxygen Furnaces 38 0.93 0.96
PCs 60 0.84 0.82
Cellphones 75 0.97 0.98
MRI 12 0.80 0.98
Internet 56 0.90 0.98
Total 696 0.87 0.91
Note: The last line (Total) reports the total sum of observations in the second column and the unweighted average
of technology correlations for columns 3 and 4.
Table 7: Correlation of Intensive and Extensive Margin with log income per capita in 2000
Invention Homothetic Non Homothetic
Technology year Obs. Int. Margin Adoption Lag Obs. Int. Margin Adoption Lag
Ships 1788 50 0.38 -0.48 31 0.52 -0.47
Rail Passengers 1825 62 0.38 -0.62 58 0.33 -0.49
Rail Freight 1825 42 0.16 -0.67 40 0.46 -0.30
Telegraph 1835 46 0.46 -0.49 37 0.49 -0.28
Telephone 1876 66 0.79 -0.49 64 0.53 -0.37
Electricity 1882 97 0.76 -0.57 50 0.68 -0.27
Trucks 1885 57 0.53 -0.35 53 0.49 -0.20
Cars 1885 73 0.51 -0.31 70 0.63 0.01
Aviation Freight 1903 30 0.85 -0.09 36 0.78 0.20
Aviation Passengers 1903 51 0.80 -0.13 53 0.79 0.23
Blast Oxygen Furnaces 1950 39 0.90 -0.33 41 0.80 -0.35
PCs 1973 68 0.69 -0.31 62 0.66 -0.40
Cellphones 1973 85 0.92 -0.57 75 0.88 -0.51
MRI 1977 12 0.79 -0.39 12 0.61 -0.44
Internet 1983 59 0.95 -0.75 56 0.84 -0.82
Total 837 0.67 -0.46 738 0.64 -0.30
Note: The Homothetic columns refer to the baseline model, while the Non-homothetic refer to the estimation using a non-
homothetic production function.The last line (Total) reports the total sum of observations in the third and sixth columns and
the unweighted average of the correlations for columns 4, 5, 7 and 8.THE INTENSIVE MARGIN OF TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 43
Figure 1: Dierences in telephone adoption subtracting own country income for four dierent
countries.
Figure 2: Intensive Margin component of TFP and dierences in income per capita. The
slope of the dashed line is .44.44 COMIN AND MESTIERI
Figure 3: Intensive Margin component of TFP and dierences in income per capita with non
homotheticities. The slope of the dashed line is .52.